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COMBATING GANG-PERPETRATED WITNESS INTIMIDATION
WITH FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING
By: Katie M. McDonough*
“[T]he Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the
1
legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts.”
INTRODUCTION
Gangs are an extreme threat to the communities in which they
2
operate and to the criminal justice system. Central to gang culture is
strong loyalty among gang members coupled with “no snitching”
3
policies enforced through intimidation and retaliation. Witnesses to
crime, gang members who have knowledge of misdeeds, and even
entire neighborhoods are fearful about cooperating with law
4
enforcement in gang-controlled communities. The risk run by
cooperating with law enforcement is real: many witnesses are attacked
or killed, and residents in gang-controlled communities who report
crimes to law enforcement face the prospect of retaliatory crimes
5
against their person, property, and family members. Criminal gangs
benefit from enforcing “no snitching” policies with intimidation and
6
retribution. Successful witness intimidation or murder renders a
witness unavailable, which means that the witness’s information is
7
likely to be inadmissible in court. This often forces prosecutors to
delay trial, reduce charges, or drop cases altogether, bringing the
8
wheels of justice to a grinding halt. The common law doctrine of
* Katie M. McDonough, J.D., 2013, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A.,
2008, College of the Holy Cross. With gratitude to my advisor, Professor D. Michael
Risinger, for his encouragement; debts owed to the editors of the Seton Hall Law
Review for their talent; and appreciation to my husband, Michael G. McDonough,
for his support.
1
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
2
See Part I infra.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
FED. R. EVID. 802 (restyled).
8
See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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“forfeiture by wrongdoing” provides a means to overcome the hurdle
of an unavailable witness where the government can show that the
defendant, by his own conduct, caused the unavailability of the
9
witness and concurrently intended to silence him.
The prosecutor’s challenge is greater if the defendant is not the
party who silenced the witness. While a defendant is awaiting trial,
especially if he is in jail, his fellow gang members may be able and
willing to act on his behalf and carry out his gang’s “no snitching”
policy by intimidating or harming adverse witnesses while avoiding
contact with the defendant that might invite an inference of
10
consultation. If a witness is silenced, her prior statements may be
inadmissible and the defendant granted a windfall unless the
prosecution can make the showing necessary to invoke forfeiture by
wrongdoing. To do so in federal court, the prosecution has to prove,
at the very least, that the defendant “acquiesced” in the
11
intimidation.
If the statements of the absent declarant contain
12
“testimonial” statements, the prosecution will have to take the extra
9

See generally Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
E.g., David Kocieniewski, With Witnesses at Risk, Murder Suspects Go Free, N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
1,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/01/nyregion
/01witness.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&
(describing
how
prolific
witness
intimidation in New Jersey turns “slam-dunk cases” into failed prosecutions, like the
case of one particular gang member, who witnessed a murder but “quickly
announced he would never testify for fear he would be ostracized for helping the
police—or wind up murdered himself”) [hereinafter Witnesses At Risk]; see also, e.g.,
Urias v. Horel, No. CV 07-7155-JVS (RNB), 2008 WL 4363064, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2008) (civilian bystander to gang shooting was instructed not to attend
court and then shot to death); David Kocieniewski, A Little Girl Shot, and a Crowd that
Didn’t See, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/nyregion
/09taj.html?pagewanted=all (relating how the grandmother of a seven-year-old girl
shot in the crossfire of a gang fight would not talk to the police for fear she would
“have to move out of the country[,]” and that at least twenty other eyewitnesses
remain unwilling to testify about this unsolved crime).
11
FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (6) (restyled).
12
In this Comment, the word “testimonial” is short-hand for “testimonial in the
Crawford sense” to account a new definition employed by the Supreme Court since
Crawford v. Washington. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In that case, the Court changed the
usage of the phrase “testimonial statements” from “statements of fact or value”
subject to an “assertion” requirement to a phrase meaning “statements made under
circumstances objectively indicating some contemplation of later use at trial.”
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Toward a Unified Theory of Testimonial Evidence Under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (2007) (attempting to
harmonize the two usages). For an example of the former usage, see, e.g., Schmerber
v. California, which notes that Wigmore used the word “testimonial” to mean
“communicative.” 384 U.S. 757, 774 (1966) (citing 8 WIGMORE 378) (McNaughton
rev. 1961) (noting that Wigmore used the word “testimonial” to mean
“communicative.”).
10
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step of showing that the defendant had the purpose of silencing the
declarant—i.e., had “specific intent”—a concept which, if too
narrowly construed by courts, will allow the defendant to benefit
from witness intimidation carried out by his peers as long as he did
13
not specifically take part in or authorize the intimidation.
This Comment addresses the specific challenges of invoking
forfeiture by wrongdoing against a gang member-defendant whose
gang silences adverse witnesses on his behalf. Part I establishes that
gang culture inspires loyalty in its members, who willingly intimidate
and silence witnesses in accordance with a gang’s “no snitching”
policy. It explains that gangs can subdue an entire community using
terror, threats, and violence to ensure that citizens do not cooperate
with the police, and it demonstrates that gangs’ “no snitching”
policies, when enforced through intimidation and retaliation, hinder
the criminal justice process. Part II examines the jurisprudence
surrounding the Confrontation Clause and forfeiture by wrongdoing.
It asks whether, after Giles v. California, forfeiture by wrongdoing is
applicable to instances of gang-perpetrated intimidation on behalf of
(but without the specific knowledge of and direct participation by)
the defendant. This Comment argues that a gang member-defendant
should forfeit his confrontation rights if he (1) joined or remained a
member of a gang (2) with knowledge that the gang enforces a “no
snitching” policy using intimidation or retaliation and (3) other gang
members cause a witness’s unavailability in the defendant’s trial. This
Comment ultimately concludes that these circumstances should
satisfy the Giles “specific intent” requirement.
I. LOST TESTIMONY: GANG-ENFORCED “NO SNITCHING” POLICIES
SILENCE WITNESSES
Organized street gangs are not new phenomena, and street-gang
culture is not a contemporary invention. Gang culture is found in
many urban communities, new immigrant groups, and poverty14
stricken neighborhoods with few social controls.
Poverty,
heterogeneity of race or ethnicity (which gives rise to homogenous
“subcultures”), and residential mobility, together, correlate with of a
13

See infra text accompanying note 152.
Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence, and Social Control: The
Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 189 (2008)
(“[C]onditions of structural poverty strain a community’s ability to develop informal
social controls. Socially organized or cohesive communities are better able to engage
in informal social control that can lead to lower levels of crime than communities
that are not cohesive.”).
14
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high degree of delinquency in a community and render a
community ripe for the development of street gangs. Frederic M.
Thrasher, an early twentieth-century criminologist, described the
development of gangs in this way:
The gang is an interstitial group originally formed
spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict. It is
characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting
face to face, milling, movement through space as a unit,
conflict, and planning.
The result of this collective
behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective
internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group
16
awareness, and attachment to a local territory.
Gang members, even if organized informally, share experiences that
17
foster loyalty and form them into a cohesive unit. A dramatic 1928
chronicle of the rise of mid-nineteenth-century gangs in New York
City explained that poverty, instability at home, lack of direction, and
community disorganization fostered the development of gangsters in
18
those urban slums.
Even then, welfare agencies and religious
leaders faced seemingly insurmountable challenges in combating the
petty crime, violence, gambling, widespread alcohol abuse, starvation,
19
and squalor among which the gangs proliferated.
Gangs manifest their own norms comprising unique rules and
20
customs. Such culture is not new: gangs in the early nineteenth and
15

SOPHIE BODY-GENDROT, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CITIES?: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 7 (2000) (referencing the observation of criminologists Shaw and McKay
that it is difficult to free a neighborhood from these conditions).
16
FREDERIC M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 46
(1927) (emphasis in original).
17
ALBERT K. COHEN, DELINQUENT BOYS: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG 13, 35 (The
Free Press 1955). Gangs share a “delinquent subculture” that “is itself a positive code
with a definite if unconventional moral flavor.” Id.
18
HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK xvi – xvii (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1928).
19
Id. at 15–16.
20
E.g., Ray Rivera, In Newburgh, Gangs and Violence Reign, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/nyregion/12newburgh.html?sq=gang%20cul
ture&st=nyt&adxnnl=1&scp=3&adxnnlx=
1329195879-V9JrNbOnzk7fWHmncqs8CA&pagewanted=1 (describing growth of
local street gangs in Newburgh, New York and referencing gang flags, clothing, and
the concept of “respect”); Serge F. Kovaleski, Wanted: A Band of Men and Boys, N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
15,
2007,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E4D71539F936A2575BC0A96
19C8B63&scp=10&sq=gang%20culture&st=nyt&pagewanted=1
(describing
the
recruiting tactics of MS-13 in New Jersey, its origins as a Salvadoran gang, and its
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early twentieth centuries possessed their own names, clothing styles,
21
The unique style and identifying
codes, reputations, and lore.
characteristics of those early American street gangs lives on today in
the gang colors, graffiti signs, and other symbols that contemporary
street gangs have adopted. Today, gang members are tattooed with
gang identifiers, wear certain styles of dress adopted by their gang,
22
and display gang insignia on jackets, hats, and pants. For instance,
in southern California, Hispanic gangs often wear white tee shirts and
23
24
a black or blue knit cap, while Blood and Crip sets dress
individually but accessorize in gang colors (red and blue,
25
respectively). Graffiti are utilized to mark gang turf, indicate gang
status, make threats against a rival gang, or declare participation in a
26
particular crime that was committed.
Gangs set themselves apart from the communities that they seek
27
to control.
A 1950s examination of delinquent youth gangs
concluded that gang members recognize only the authority of their
own leaders, have relations of intense solidarity with each other, and
have “indifferent, hostile and rebellious” relations with non-gang
28
members and authority figures. This view of the delinquent youth
gang—articulated before the proliferation of guns and drugs that
colors).
21
THRASHER, supra note 16, at 190–93; ASBURY, supra note 18, at 28. For instance,
in New York, the Daybreak Boys operated as an organized criminal enterprise
committing heinous crimes on the riverfront, and the Molasses Gang would
systematically rob stores and pick pockets. Id. at 66. The Dead Rabbits wore a red
stripe on their pants, while the Plug Uglies, wearing plug hats, were feared for
inflicting terrible violence on their victims with bludgeons and pistols. Id. at 22.
22
Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern California (Gang
Characteristics), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004, http://lang.dailynews.com
/socal/gangs/articles/dnp4_gcharacter.asp [hereinafter Gang Characteristics].
23
Gang Characteristics, supra note 22.
24
Large gangs may be comprised of local sub-groups, or “sets,” which operate
independently and may be in competition with neighboring sets of the gang. See,
e.g., NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, DIVISION OF STATE POLICE,
INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GANGS IN NEW JERSEY: MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE
TO THE 2010 NJSP GANG SURVEY 12, available at http://www.njsp.org
/info/pdf/gangs_in_nj_2010.pdf.
25
Gang Characteristics, supra note 22.
26
Id.
27
Joseph Goldstein, 43 in Two Warring Gangs are Indicted in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/nyregion/43-in-warringbrooklyn-gangs-are-indicted.html?scp=1&sq=gang+culture+kelly+respect&st=nyt
(quoting a Brooklyn district attorney’s statement that street gang members in
Brooklyn “‘band together to control their turf, their block or their building, and
terrorize those who fail to recognize their control and fail to pay them respect’”).
28
COHEN, supra note 17, at 30–31.
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characterize street gangs today—reinforces the assertion that the
fundamental characteristics of gangs remain unchanged. Today,
contemporary gang members set themselves apart by characterizing
their activity as a war between themselves and other segments of
society, even going as far as attacking rivals and police officers to
29
develop fearsome reputations as forces with which to be reckoned.
Gang members act outside of the law and traditional norms of their
own communities, actively seeking to intimidate residents and law
enforcement in (often successful) attempts to establish control and
30
instill fear.
31
While street gangs are not necessarily criminal, the gangs with
which this Comment (and law enforcement) is concerned are those
that engage in crime regularly. Although each law-enforcement
organization has its own definition of what constitutes a “gang,”
nearly all list group criminality as the most important defining
32
characteristic. Local street gangs may be driven by the desire to
29

Tracy Manzer, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern
California (From His Own Words), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 27, 2004,
http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/lbp2_james.asp.
30
Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern
DAILY
NEWS,
Sept.
30,
2004,
California
(Gangster
Menace),
L.A.
http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/dnp5_main.asp
[hereinafter
Gangster Menace].
31
For example, debates can be had over the dominantly criminal nature of some
civil rights-era gangs. E.g., James Alan McPherson, Chicago’s Blackstone Rangers (I),
ATLANTIC MAGAZINE (May 1969) (detailing the often-violent history of Ranger Nation
and the fact that it was “alternately praised and condemned by the national press,
their community, the United States Senate, the local police, and Chicago youth
organizations” such that “it is almost impossible to maintain a consistent opinion of
the Blackstone Rangers”); Jennifer 8. Lee, The Young Lords Legacy of Puerto Rican
Activism, N.Y. TIMES, City Room (Aug. 24, 2009, 11:07 a.m.),
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/
the-young-lords-legacy-of-puerto-rican-activism/ (describing the “confrontational
tactics” of the short-lived New York chapter of the Young Lords, which successfully
launched a “Garbage Offensive” to obtain municipal services for local residents).
32
National Youth Gang Survey Analysis: Defining Gangs and Designating Gang
Membership, NAT’L GANG CTR., available at http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/SurveyAnalysis/Defining-Gangs#anchordcog (last visited Dec. 18, 2011). There are six
characteristics that are common to most definitions of “gang”: (1) whether the group
engages in criminality; (2) whether leadership is present; (3) whether the group has
a name; (4) whether it displays colors or symbols; (5) whether the group hangs out
together; and (6) whether the group has a turf or territory. Id. “Gang” in the school
setting may be defined as “a somewhat organized group, sometimes having turf
concerns, symbols, special dress or colors. . . . [that has] a special interest in violence
for status-providing purposes and is recognized as a gang by its members and by
others,” or a group that “has a name and engages in fighting, stealing, or selling
drugs.” GARY D. GOTTFREDSON & DENISE C. GOTTFREDSON, GANG PROBLEMS AND GANG
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control a neighborhood, such as the “Goodfellas,” “‘one of Central
Harlem’s most violent and destructive street gangs,’” which allegedly
obtained firearms for the purpose of intimidating rivals and keeping
33
them off Goodfella turf.
Gang activity is often conducted for
reputational gain, both for the individual (as in the case of a Fairfax,
Virginia man associated with a local MS-13 set, sentenced to life in
prison for offering young girls “free of charge to full-fledged gang
34
members to improve his own standing” ) and for the gang (as in the
case of an officer shot purposely to demonstrate to a rival gang that
35
the shooter’s gang was tough ). Some gangs make group criminality
36
Large-scale organizations not only
their primary purpose.
mastermind racketeering and narcotics trafficking for commercial
gain, but “a slew of gangs, including the Bloods, Crips, Gangster
Disciples, Vice Lords, and Latin Kings are branching out into
mortgage fraud, identity theft, the manufacturing of counterfeit
37
checks, and bank fraud.” Today, gangs are active in all fifty states
and, in some communities, are responsible for up to eighty percent
38
of crime. They are the main retail distributors of illegal drugs across
PROGRAMS IN A NATIONAL SAMPLE OF SCHOOLS 4 (2001), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/194607NCJRS.pdf.
33
Colin Moynihan, Prosecutors Target Gang in Harlem; 19 Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/05/nyregion/19-arrested-as-prosecutorstarget-goodfellas-gang-in-harlem.html?_r=1 (quoting Manhattan District Attorney
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr.).
34
Andrea McCarren, MS13 Street Gang and Others Tied to Child Prostitution, 9 NEWS
NOW, Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.wusa9.com/news/article/173540/187/FedsProsecute-Gang-Related-Child-Sex-Traffickers; see, e.g., Beth Barrett, Grieving Mothers:
None Wounded More Deeply by Gang Violence, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004,
http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/printpage.asp?REF=/socal/gangs/articles/
dnp6_main.asp [hereinafter Grieving Mothers] (explaining that the murderer of Roy
Brian Marino, an innocent teen, was motivated by the desire for “status” in a
Pacioma, California gang).
35
David Kocieniewski, Gang Rivalry Cited in Police Captain’s Shooting, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/22/nyregion
/gang-rivalry-cited-in-police-captain-s-shooting.html?ref=davidkocieniewski.
36
For a colorful example, see ASBURY, supra note 18, at 227–28 (describing gangs
like the Whyos, a pre-Civil War New York City gang that committed crimes, including
murder, mayhem, breaking bones, or even chewing off a victim’s ear, for money).
37
Loren Berlin, Street Gangs Clean Up on White Collar Crime, DAILY FIN., Oct. 28,
2011,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/10/28/street-gangs-new-dirtymoneymaker-white-collar-crime/.
38
Key Findings: National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, NAT’L GANG INTEL. CTR.
(Jan. 2009),at iii, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/national-gangthreat-assessment-2009-pdf. There are nearly one million active gang members in
the United States participating in the criminal activity of approximately 33,000 street
gangs, motorcycle gangs, and prison gangs. Gangs, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(Nov. 6, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc_majorthefts/gangs
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the country and are increasingly involved in wholesale distribution.
Alien-smuggling, armed robbery, auto theft, extortion, identity theft,
40
and murder are among gangs’ typical criminal activities today.
Gangs increase their power by defending their turf and fighting
rivals. Today’s much-publicized enmity between the Bloods and the
41
Crips serves as just one example. At its worst, gang street fighting—
whether with knives and bludgeons 150 years ago or handguns and
42
The
rifles today—can hold an entire neighborhood hostage.
43
presence of rival groups brings potential threats to an existing gang.
This increases gang unity and “fosters beliefs that protection comes
44
Gang
from gang cohesion and the preparation for violence.”
violence is cyclical, strengthening the perception that gang
membership is necessary for protection from future gang violence,
45
which increases membership and perpetrates violence against rivals.
Gangs may even operate together to combat a common enemy; for
instance, members and associates of some gangs in southern
California operate independently but, if in jail, join together as the
/gangs.
39
Key Findings: National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, supra note 38.
40
National Youth Gang Survey Analysis, supra note 32.
41
E.g., Grieving Mothers, supra note 34 (explaining the origins of the war between
the Bloods and the Crips and noting that, for decades, the majority of gang murders
in Los Angeles have been attributable to it).
42
Keith Donoghue, Note, Casualties of War: Criminal Drug Law Enforcement and its
Special Costs for the Poor, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1778, 1786–87 (2002) (explaining that poor
urban communities are the locus for drug transactions, which bring with them
violence aimed to protect contested territory and intimidate potential informants.);
ASBURY, supra note 18, at 29 (“Sometimes the battles raged for two or three days
without cessation, while the streets of the gang area were barricaded with carts and
paving stones, and the gangsters blazed away at each other with musket and
pistol . . . .”); see also Videtta A. Brown, Gang Member Perpetrated Domestic Violence: A New
Conversation, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 395, 409 (2007) (“When
gang members are present, the atmosphere in neighborhoods is riddled with fear.”).
43
GOTTFREDSON, supra note 32, at 7 (focusing on the rise of youth gangs in
schools).
44
Id.
45
Id. (“[F]ear of violence leads to participation in the instigation of violence
against sources of perceived threat.”). It is difficult not to be reminded of the scene
set by Thomas Hobbes as he portrayed the state of nature:
During the time men live without a common power to keep them all in
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is
of every man against every man . . . . In such condition there is no
place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and
consequently . . . no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear,
and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 86 (Forgotten Books 2008).
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46

Eme, the so-called “Mexican Mafia.”
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of gang culture is the
strong loyalty it both inspires and demands. The gang becomes, to
members, “a separate, distinct and often irresistible focus of
47
attraction, loyalty and solidarity.” By and large, whether a gang is
made up of mere delinquents or hardened criminals willing to
engage in gun violence, drug sales, and turf wars, all gangs retain
48
cultural codes to which members adhere. These codes generally
49
mandate solidarity and loyalty to fellow gang members, sometimes
50
Many gangs have elaborate initiation
mimicking family ties.
procedures that can include getting “jumped in”—beat up by
51
admitted members—to demonstrate total dedication to the gang.
46

People v. Sisneros, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). The Mexican
Mafia, or Eme, is a particularly fearsome gang that raises money by committing
crimes, including murder, and employing various local neighborhood gangs to
collect “taxes” from drug dealers. Id. A member of a street gang may become an Eme
associate by earning money for the gang and assaulting inmates as instructed, and an
associate may become one of its few members by gaining a sponsor and executing a
killing on behalf of the gang. Id. The price of leaving the gang is death, and
members and associates are permitted neither to admit their affiliation with the
Mexican Mafia nor cooperate with law enforcement and inform on other affiliates.
Id. at 103. Cooperation among rival gangs is not new: feuding gangs in nineteenthcentury New York City at times joined to fight a common rival gang, ASBURY, supra
note 18, at 29, or attack police to render law enforcement ineffective on their turf.
Id. at 24, 44, 235.
47
COHEN, supra note 17, at 31.
48
See, e.g., Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in
Southern California (L.A. Gang History Runs Deep), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2004,
http://lang.dailnews.com/social/gangs/articles/dnp6_main.asp [hereinafter L.A.
Gang History] (“Loyalty remains across geographic boundaries, with gang members
keeping their affiliations as they change addresses across town or across the
country.”).
49
Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 777
(2008) (observing that in gangs, “loyalty to the organization and hierarchy within the
organization are strong forces that impact the relationships of the members of the
organization,” causing members to be reluctant to accuse one another and unwilling
to cooperate with law enforcement out of fear of “serious harm to the accuser’s
welfare”).
50
E.g., 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASIAN AMERICAN ISSUES TODAY 859 (Edith Wen-Chu
Chen & Grace J. Yoo eds., ABC-CLIO, LLC 2010) (explicating that at-risk Asian
American youths find camaraderie, security, and cultural pride in joining street
gangs, but with these benefits comes the need to retain the respect of this new
“family” by witnessing or committing violent crimes).
51
E.g., State v. McCoy, 928 P.2d 647, 650 (Ariz. 1996) (holding as evidence
supporting conviction for participating in a criminal street gang that the defendant
participated in his gang’s “aggravated assaults on an ongoing basis as part of their
ritual for initiating new members and ousting disloyal members,” called “jumping
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Another common ritual for admittance is commission of a violent
52
crime ; for instance, some violent gangs require members to commit
53
murder to show their loyalty and gain full membership. Women
who wish to join may be “sexed in,” or required to have sex with
54
multiple gang members.
55
Street gangs vigorously enforce a ban on assisting the police.
Specifically, gangs discourage giving information to police—called
56
“snitching” —even if doing so would incriminate members of other
57
gangs.
With legal recourse unavailable to enforce contracts and
in”).
52

See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(recounting expert opinion that “respect is ‘everything’ to a gang member” and that
both gangs and gang members earn respect by committing crimes, “especially violent
crimes”); AUGUSTINE E. COSTELLO, HISTORY OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF JERSEY CITY
229 (The Police Relief Assoc. Publ’n Co. 1891) (stating that membership in the
Lavas gang required a robbery, burglary, a single-handed assault on a police officer,
or going to jail as a recruit); Maureen Graham, et al., 6 Indicted in 5 N.J. Killings The
Suspects Are Members of the Camden Gang Sons of Malcolm X, PHILLY.COM, Apr. 9, 1993,
http://articles.philly.com/1993-04-09/news/
25980283_1_gang-member-murder-rate-law-enforcement.
53
Alan Jackson, Prosecuting Gang Cases: What Local Prosecutors Need to Know, 42JUN PROSECUTOR 32, 33–34 (Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n 2008); Brown, supra note 42,
at 408. This initiation procedure is not unique to contemporary street gang culture.
E.g., ASBURY, supra note 18, at 227 (relating tales of the Whyo gang, which accepted
members only after they committed a murder or other crime serious enough to
demonstrate dedication to the gang).
54
Brown, supra note 42.
55
E.g., David Kocieniewski, So Many Crimes, and Reasons to Not Cooperate, N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
30,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/30/nyregion
/30witness.html?ref=davidkocieniewski (“[T]he Whitman Park section of Camden is
on the front lines of the struggle with witness intimidation. An array of powerful
forces converge here to discourage people from cooperating with the investigation of
crimes—crimes committed against their own homes, their own neighbors, their own
children. Drugs are sold openly from street corners and abandoned row houses.
Gunfire is a neighborhood soundtrack. And the competing gangs that control
Whitman Park have made it clear that the price for defying them is death.”).
56
See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING 3 (2009). Snitching was originally a word
reserved for criminals who ratted out their associates in exchange for a lighter
sentence or reduced charges, id., but a “mentality has started to seep into the
neighborhood where ordinary, upstanding people who would come forward because
a crime occurred are now being told they are snitches.” Brendan L. Smith, Keeping A
‘Snitch’ from Being Scratched: Witness Intimidation Is Gaining Even As the Murder Rate
Declines, 94-DEC A.B.A. J. 20, 21 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57
E.g., People v. Sisneros, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 103 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). In
Sisneros, a shooting was perpetrated by an alleged associate of the Mexican Mafia, and
an innocent witness—who was a member of a separate Hispanic street gang—knew
the identity of the shooter. Id. Not only did the witness refuse to “snitch” to the
police, he would not return to the neighborhood where the shooting took place, nor
was he safe in police custody from the possibility of being beaten or killed because he
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regulate underground commerce, gangs—particularly those involved
in the drug trade—resort to intimidation and murder to protect their
58
Gang members make it no secret that “ratting out”
businesses.
59
fellow members can have dire consequences.
In 2004, a muchcirculated DVD titled “Stop Snitching” featured Baltimore gangsters
who named snitches “in the game” and threatened that snitches
60
61
might “get a hole in their head.” In a Colorado case, a defendant
was found guilty of charges including first-degree murder for paying
his friend and two members of an ethnic Cambodian gang a total of
$20,000 to shoot and kill a cooperating witness after the witness
62
implicated the defendant in the sale and distribution of drugs. “No
Snitching” is now a popular refrain that summarizes gang culture’s
63
ban on police cooperation. The producer of the “No Snitching”
DVD insisted that the DVD was directed at criminal associates, not
64
“civilian witnesses,” but it became a popular symbol that extended
65
beyond the world of gangsters. “Stop Snitching” tee shirts began to
appear in courtrooms to intimidate witnesses unaffiliated with
66
gangs, celebrity rappers publicly refused to share information about
67
shootings they witnessed, and commentators began to cover the “No
68
Snitching” phenomenon in mainstream media.
Today, justice goes unserved in some communities in significant
part because the perpetrators of violent witness intimidation target
not only gang members but also the innocent residents of gangwitnessed the crime. Id.
58
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons From
Economics, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 220 (1994).
59
See Kocieniewski, supra note 10.
60
NATAPOFF, supra note 56, at 122.
61
See generally People v. Hagos, 250 P.3d 596 (Colo. App. 2009).
62
Id. at 606–07.
63
See NATAPOFF, supra note 56.
64
Id.
65
Tom Farrey, ‘Snitching’ Controversy Goes Well Beyond ‘Melo, ESPN The Magazine,
January
18,
2006,
available
at
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns
/story?columnist=farrey_tom&id=2296590.
66
See Fox Butterfield, Guns and Jeers Used by Gangs to Buy Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/16/national/16gangs.html (relating
that gang members were in the courtroom wearing tee-shirts that said “Stop
Snitching” when two other gang members were on trial for murdering a ten-yearold).
67
Rick Hampson, Anti-Snitch Campaign Riles Police, Prosecutors, USA TODAY, Mar.
28, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-03-28-stop-snitching_x.htm
(explaining how rappers Lil’ Kim and Busta Rhymes refused to cooperate with police
in order to remain “credible rappers” in accordance with the “code of the street”).
68
NATAPOFF, supra note 56, at 122–24.
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69

controlled communities. While “No Snitching” used to be a policy
reserved for gang members, regular citizens in some communities are
treated as “snitches” simply for talking to or cooperating with law
70
enforcement. The 2000 National Youth Gang Survey stated that
gang-related witness intimidation was reported as “common” by sixty71
six percent of responding law-enforcement agencies. In that same
survey, eighty-two percent of respondents stated that their agencies
72
were taking action to correct the problem. A general sense of fear is
not uncommon in a gang-controlled locale marred by a history of
violent retaliation against witnesses and a community-wide distrust of
73
the criminal justice system.
To compound the problem, the communities in which gangs
proliferate tend to have a history of poor relations with local law
74
enforcement on which gangs capitalize.
Increased policing in
violent neighborhoods, if ineffective, can generate the ire and
75
distrust of the innocent civilians who reside there. In some urban
communities, the sentiment persists that the police fail to protect
racial and ethnic minorities and thus cause the epidemic of drugs
76
and violence to be concentrated in those neighborhoods. Police
69

Id. at 124 (Gang culture’s “no snitching” code “melded with the long-standing
problem of witness intimidation, and the related reluctance of civilian witnesses to
come forward when they observe violent crime”).
70
IMAGINING LEGALITY: WHERE LAW MEETS POPULAR CULTURE 59 (Austin Sarat
ed., Univ. of Ala. Press 2011).
71
John Anderson, Gang-Related Witness Intimidation, NATIONAL GANG CENTER
BULLETIN (Feb. 2007), at 1.
72
Id.
73
PETER FINN & KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, PREVENTING GANG- AND DRUG-RELATED
WITNESS INTIMIDATION: ISSUES AND PRACTICES 1–2 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice 1996). This
fear is not new: a history of the Jersey City police describes street gangs that were
“composed of young rowdies” who would regularly insult or spit on women, but
women would refuse to file formal complaints and “thus hinder the wheels of
justice.” COSTELLO, supra note 52, at 330.
74
NATAPOFF, supra note 56, at 126; see also PAUL B. WICE, CHAOS IN THE
COURTROOM: THE INNER WORKINGS OF URBAN CRIMINAL COURTS 170–71 (1985)
(observing that, in urban courts, defendants are often of lower socio-economic status
which can affect their treatment by the court, including increasing the court’s
willingness to incarcerate poor uneducated defendants who have been through the
criminal justice system before).
75
Diana Nelson Jones, Don’t Shoot: Stopping Urban Violence with Sweet Reason,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 18, 2011, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11352
/1197140-148.stm; e.g. Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, The Scars of Stop & Frisk, N.Y.
TIMES, Jun. 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/opinion/the-scars-ofstop-and-frisk.html?_r=0 (relating the impact of “stop and frisk” on one young man
who was “unjustifiably stopped by police more than 60 times” before he turned 18).
76
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 71 (Random House 1998); see,
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brutality and racially discriminatory enforcement practices in some
communities have led to distrust, actual and perceived injustice, and
77
even rioting. Such a history can contribute to the acquiescence of
entire communities to gang culture’s code of silence.
Intimidation and retaliation against citizens in gang-controlled
communities necessitates willful blindness to gang crimes by everyday
78
citizens, which increases the frequency of unreported criminality
and lessens the likelihood of convicting violent perpetrators. People
who live in gang-controlled communities live in fear caused by
calculated intimidation. For instance, an innocent citizen may, as a
matter of course, be subject to demands for money whenever he
leaves his home and forced to witness continual public drug
79
transactions and loitering by gang members. If he speaks to the
police about these crimes, he risks retaliatory physical attacks on his
80
person and property.
In a recent Michigan case, an innocent
witness who had information about the shooter in a gang-related
attack refused to tell the police anything until the police threatened
81
to investigate him.
He explained that the code of the street is
e.g., Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern
California (Bratton’s Challenge: LAPD’s New Chief Believes Gang Problem Can Be Solved),
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2004, http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles
/ALL_p1side1.asp [hereinafter Bratton’s Challenge] (explaining that history of poor
community relations with the LAPD increases the challenge of reducing crime, and
the solution is increased investment in police officers who can become experts on
particular neighborhoods).
77
See KENNEDY, supra note 76, at 115–20 (describing instances of police brutality,
questionable acquittals of police officers by all-white juries, and the race riots that
subsequently ensued).
78
See FINN, supra note 73, at 4.
Many of the communities in which gangs operate are worlds unto
themselves—places where people live, attend school, and work all
within a radius of only a few blocks beyond which they rarely venture.
As a result, victims and witnesses are often the children of a
defendant’s friends or relatives, members of the same church as the
defendant, or classmates or neighbors. Furthermore, community
residents may regard many of the crimes for which witnesses are sought
as “business matters” among gang members or drug dealers, rather
than as offenses against the community which should inspire willing
civic participation in the process of law enforcement.
Id.
79
Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern
California (Living in Fear: Gangs Keep Stranglehold on Southland Cities), L.A. DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 28, 2004, http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/dnp3_gang3.asp
[hereinafter Living in Fear].
80
Id.
81
Jones v. Warren, No. 1:07-cv-894, 2010 WL 3779277, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Aug.
20, 2010).
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“[don’t] snitch,” which he had to obey out of fear for his life, even
82
though he was not a gang member. Moreover, this “[f]ear of gang
retaliation among honest citizens in gang-dominated neighborhoods”
forces prosecutors to rely on unwilling or tainted witnesses, such as
co-defendants, for testimony in gang cases because innocent
83
witnesses refuse to cooperate or take the stand.
A prosecutor from Suffolk County, Massachusetts has said that
witness intimidation not only “results from the tight-knit geography
of poor neighborhoods where witnesses and gang members often
know one another,” but also from the fact that “gang members have
84
become more brazen.” In California, a drug addict named Bobby
Singleton was purchasing crack cocaine in an apartment building
controlled by a gang known as The Mob Crew when a rival gang
85
member opened fire. Singleton, injured in the cross-fire, told police
86
he could identify the shooter, a member of the Primera Flats gang.
When the shooter was released on bail, he appeared at Singleton’s
residence, instructed Singleton not to appear in court, stated, “I will
87
look for you and kill you,” and flashed a gun. Two days later, the
shooter returned in a van with his associates and took Singleton
88
Singleton was found later that night on a bench, shot to
away.
89
death. Such violent endings for innocent bystanders to, and victims
of, violent crime are not rare in gang-infested communities. Rather,
they serve as frequent, stark reminders that all citizens—not just gang
members—are subject to punishment for violating the “no snitching”
code.
Even where a witness is safe from direct intimidation by a
defendant, other gang members will enforce the “no snitching”
policy on the defendant’s behalf. Gangs’ emphasis on loyalty
coupled with their willingness to intimidate and retaliate renders it
unsurprising when gangs interfere with a witness on behalf of a
member who is on trial. Gang members will appear in court as
observers because their mere presence can frighten witnesses into not

82

Id.
FINN, supra note 73, at 4.
84
Butterfield, supra note 66.
85
Urias v. Horel, No. CV 07-7155-JVS (RNB), 2008 WL 4363064, at *2–3 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 25, 2008).
86
Id. at *3.
87
Id.
88
Id. at *4.
89
Id.
83
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testifying. Such intimidation can go undetected. Moreover, even if
a judge was aware of such a tactic and considered closing the
courtroom, the defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial is
92
generally paramount.
Incarcerated witnesses are also in great
93
danger of gang-related intimidation because gangs have associates
94
in prisons that will carry out “hits” and beatings as ordered. Gangs
will target civilian witnesses (such as Martha Puebla, who testified for
the prosecution in a gang-related double-murder case and was shot
95
multiple times in retaliation one week later ) and even police officers
(such as Richard Elizondo, who in 1998 was shot and paralyzed in an
attempted assassination days before he was to testify about a gang96
related homicide ).
While sometimes a defendant is directly involved in ordering or
97
causing witness intimidation, it is often difficult to prove that a gang
member-defendant directly ordered or perpetrated the intimidation
98
himself. Moreover, fear of a gang’s retaliation can silence a witness
90

FINN, supra note 73, at xi.
See id.
92
See Rachel G. Piven-Kehrle, Annotation, Basis for Exclusion of Public from State
Criminal Trial in Order to Preserve Safety, Confidentiality, or Well-Being of Witness Who Is
Not Undercover Police Officer, 33 A.L.R.6th 1 (2008).
93
FINN, supra note 73, at xi–xii; e.g., David Kocieniewski, Not Scared, or Scalded,
Into Silence, Ex-Gang Leader Takes Stand in Trenton Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/nyregion/28gang.html?ref=davidkocieniewsk
i (describing how Roberto “Bam Bam Rodriguez,” a former leader of the Latin Kings
in Trenton, New Jersey, took the stand in a murder trial despite an attack by another
inmate intended to silence him after he was labeled a “snitch”).
94
Gangster Menace, supra note 30 (explaining that today, much of the violence is
dictated by prison gangs that order killings and other crimes from within prison).
95
Beth Barrett, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in Southern
California (Agony of Victims: Behind Each Tragedy Lie Grief and Heartache of Friends,
Family), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004 http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs
/articles/dnp4_gang4.asp [hereinafter Agony of Victims].
96
Dana Bartholomew, Terror in Our Streets: A Special Report on Gang Violence in
Southern California (Targets of Gang Violence), L.A. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 29, 2004,
http://lang.dailynews.com/socal/gangs/articles/dnp5_main.asp.
97
E.g., United States v. Baskerville, Nos. 07-2927 & 11-1175, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20869, at *2–3 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2011). Just before William Baskerville, a
Newark, New Jersey drug kingpin, was to go to trial on drug charges, the key witness
against Baskerville, Kemo McCray, was shot and killed by members of Baskerville’s
“crew.” Id. Federal prosecutors employed forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit
McCray’s prior statements, even though McCray was shot by an associate of
Baskerville, not by Baskerville himself. Id. They were able to do so with evidence
that Baskerville actually ordered the member of his “crew” to kill McCray. Id.
Baskerville was sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to murder a witness,
retaliating against a federal informant, and distributing drugs. Id
98
Smith, supra note 56, at 21 (explaining that witness intimidation is perpetrated
91
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even if the defendant takes no action. That defendant benefits from
his gang’s “no snitching” policy without any specific request or
99
The result is that a gang memberparticipation on his part.
defendant may enjoy stalled prosecutions, dropped charges, or no
charges at all by virtue of his membership in a gang that intimidates,
retaliates against, or murders witnesses who may otherwise be willing
100
to cooperate with police.
For instance, in the trial of two men
charged with the drive-by shooting of an eight-year-old boy, one of
the defendants profited from a deadlocked jury because some
witnesses recanted their testimony and others refused to speak at all
101
out of fear of gang retaliation. As a result, the convicted defendant
received a life sentence, while the other smiled as he pleaded no
102
contest to the reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter. When a
gang enforces a “no snitching” policy against its own members and
civilian witnesses, it substantially interferes with the criminal justice
process, terrorizes neighborhoods, and grants a windfall to the
defendant by virtue of his membership in a criminal enterprise.
The echoes of witness intimidation reverberate far beyond the
courtroom. Urban communities have different conviction rates than
103
suburban communities, depending on the type of crime. In urban
areas, drug felony convictions are highest, particularly when
compared to suburban communities, resulting in a high rate of
104
imprisonment of the urban population.
In contrast, violent
felonies are successfully prosecuted at a significantly lower rate in
105
urban neighborhoods than in suburban neighborhoods.
This is
partly due to “the economics of law enforcement,” which aims “to
not only by defendants but also by their friends or associates, who may employ tactics
such as packing the courtroom and staring down everyone in it).
99
See id.
100
E.g., David Kocieniewski, Few Choices in Shielding of Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/nyregion/28witness.html?ref=
davidkocieniewski (detailing how, in a quadruple homicide, prosecutors were forced
to drop all charges due to the intimidation and murder of witnesses); David
Kocieniewski, Keeping Witnesses Off Stand to Keep Them Safe, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/nyregion/19witness.html?ref=davidkocieniew
ski.
101
Grieving Mothers, supra note 34. Five witnesses recanted their statements to
police and others refused to testify, which is a common problem among witnesses
from the community, according to Deputy District Attorney Anthony J. Falangetti.
Id.
102
Id.
103
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55 (2011).
104
Id.
105
Id.
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punish as many crimes as budgets allow.” Drug convictions are easy
107
and cheap to obtain, while violent crime prosecutions are pricey
and convictions are rare. Another key factor is that gangs—which
operate primarily in urban communities—are incredibly effective at
eliminating the witnesses necessary to prove violent felonies in a
108
court of law.
Because violence goes largely unpunished in areas
blighted with widespread witness silence, similar crimes are punished
109
differently depending on a community’s demographics.
William
Stuntz referred to this as “discriminatory justice” that “runs headlong
into the moral argument for treating criminals and crime victims
110
from different demographic groups the same.”
Witness
intimidation by gangs, then, has not only a local effect on crime rates,
but a broad impact on the administration of criminal justice and its
sociological effects.
The heart of the problem resides within the four walls of the
courtroom. American trial courts rely heavily on live witness
testimony, which means that living, willing witnesses are crucial to the
111
administration of justice.
Without witness statements as evidence,
violent crimes will go unpunished. One way to combat this problem
is to admit into evidence the prior statements of witnesses who were
112
intimidated or killed by gang members before trial.
Combatting
gang-perpetrated witness intimidation in this way will increase the
possibility of successfully prosecuting violent gang memberdefendants and thereby decrease the payoff of intimidation.
Admission of the prior statements of a silenced witness—presented to
a jury only after proof of murder or intimidation by gang members—
will promote equal justice and combat the reigns of terror imposed
by street gangs.
II. FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING AND GILES V. CALIFORNIA
Successful intimidation or murder of government witnesses by
members of a defendant’s gang weakens the government’s case and
can force a prosecutor to drop all charges because statements by the
106

Id. (considering the effects of retributivism in poor black neighborhoods).
Id.
108
Id. at 79–80.
109
STUNTZ, supra note 103, at 55.
110
Id.
111
See id. at 79.
112
This can be done by a sworn deposition, but one may not be admitted as
evidence until a defendant is charged, which limits its effectiveness against the threat
of witness tampering.
107
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now-unavailable witness may be inadmissible in court for two
independent, but somewhat similar, reasons: (1) the statements
113
satisfy no exception to the hearsay rule, or (2) even if they do satisfy
an exception to the hearsay rule, the statements do not satisfy an
exception to the constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses at
114
trial.
The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing operates as an
exception to both grounds of exclusion, and it should be utilized to
admit at trial the prior statements of witnesses who are silenced by a
defendant’s gang associates.
A. Bars to Admission of Prior Statements by Witnesses
1.

The Evidentiary Bar to Admission: The Hearsay Rule

Each jurisdiction creates its own rules of evidence, which
includes the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule strictly prohibits
admission of out-of-court statements by absent declarants unless
115
exceptions listed in a jurisdiction’s rules of evidence apply, even if
116
the witness is unavailable to testify. In a criminal case, if a witness
refuses to take the stand, flees the jurisdiction, or dies, it is likely that
a jury will not hear the information that the unavailable witness
previously communicated because, commonly, no exception to the
hearsay rule applies to such circumstances.
One exception to the hearsay rule is the doctrine of “forfeiture
117
by wrongdoing.”
It operates to allow the admission of hearsay
where the defendant, by his wrongdoing, caused the declarant to be
113

E.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 (setting forth the exclusionary rule that hearsay is
inadmissible unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or Supreme
Court rules explicitly allow it). Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) the declarant does
not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” FED. R. EVID.
801(c)(1)–(2).
114
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
115
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)–(6). Five exceptions to the hearsay rule in the
case of witness unavailability are included in the Federal Rules of Evidence: prior
testimony subject to cross-examination, a statement made under belief of impending
death, a statement against interest, a statement about the declarant’s personal or
family history, and, last but not least, forfeiture by wrongdoing. Id.
116
The Federal Rules set forth examples of unavailability including exemption
from testifying due to a privilege, refusal to testify despite a court order, lack of
memory of the declarant’s statement, inability to testify due to death or infirmity, or
absence from the proceedings despite reasonable attempts by the proponent of the
statement. FED. R. EVID. 804(a). This list is not exhaustive. STEVEN GOODE & OLIN
GUY WELLBORN III, COURTROOM EVIDENCE HANDBOOK: 2011–2012 STUDENT EDITION
333 (West 2011) (“The listed grounds [in 804(a)] are illustrative, not exclusive.”).
117
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 354–60 (2008).
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118

unavailable to testify.
The federal version of forfeiture by
119
It
wrongdoing is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).
permits admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony if the witness
120
is unavailable due to the wrongdoing of the adverse party.
Congress adopted the Rule in 1997, and, subsequently, a number of
121
states adopted various versions of it. It is applicable to both parties,
not just the defendant, and typically requires that “the party against
whom the statement is offered (1) directly, or through others (2)
engaged in conduct that is wrongful (3) with the intent of producing
122
the declarant’s unavailability, (4) which was thereby procured.” In
most jurisdictions, the question of whether forfeiture occurred is
123
determined by a preponderance of the evidence at a Rule 104(a)
118

E.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
Id.
120
Id.
121
KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 442 (6th ed. West 2006);
see, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (“A statement offered against a party that wrongfully
caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a
witness, and did so intending that result.”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1390(a) (West 2012)
(“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the
statement is offered against a party that has engaged, or aided and abetted, in the
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant
as a witness.”); DEL. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2001) (“A statement offered against a party
that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
90.804(2)(f) (West 2012) (“A statement offered against a party that wrongfully
caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant’s unavailability as a
witness, and did so intending that result.”); ILL. EVID. R. 804(b)(5) (2011) (“A
statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that
was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 804(b)(6) (West 2012) (“A statement offered against a party
who forfeits, by virtue of wrongdoing, the right to object to its admission based on
findings by the court that (A) the witness is unavailable; (B) the party was involved
in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the witness; and (C) the party
acted with the intent to procure the witness’s unavailability.”); N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(9)
(2011) (“A statement offered against a party who has engaged, directly or indirectly,
in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the
declarant as a witness.”); PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (2013) (“A statement offered against
a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s
unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.”).
122
See BROUN, supra note 121, at 442.
123
Id. Some states, however, have adopted a heightened “clear and convincing”
standard of proof instead. E.g., State v. Mason, 162 P.3d 396, 404–05 (Wash. 2007)
(en banc), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1035 (2008) (“[T]he trial court must decide whether
the witness has been made unavailable by the wrongdoing of the accused based upon
evidence that is clear, cogent, and convincing. We recognize that this is not an easy
standard to meet, but the right of confrontation should not be easily deemed
forfeited by an accused.”); People v. Geraci, 85 N.Y.2d 359, 367 (N.Y. 1995) (opining
that “a defendant’s loss of the valued Sixth Amendment confrontation right
119
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124

proceeding.
A gang member-defendant who knows that his associates are
willing to intimidate adverse witnesses can expect that his gang will
intimidate any witness that may be adverse to him. If the gang
associates meet the defendant’s expectation by following through
with intimidating the adverse witness, the forfeiture exception should
apply against the defendant because his wrongdoing—remaining in
the gang with the expectation of witness tampering on his behalf—
caused the unavailability of the declarant. The hearsay rule should
be no bar to juries hearing the statements of the unavailable
declarant because, had the defendant not joined or remained in the
gang, its members would not have acted to protect him. Application
of forfeiture by wrongdoing to scenarios of gang-perpetrated
intimidation may lessen the incentive to silence witnesses who could
testify against gang member-defendants because intimidating or
killing the witness would not prevent admission of his testimony.
This could increase the safety of witnesses and would help persuade
reluctant witnesses to testify.
2.

The Constitutional Bar to Admission: The Right of
Confrontation

Even if a hearsay exception—such as forfeiture by wrongdoing—
could be interpreted to allow the admission of statements by a
declarant silenced by a defendant’s gang associates, the second
hurdle to admission remains: would such an exception violate the
right to confrontation?
The Founders preserved this right in the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause, which states that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
125
with the witnesses against him.”
This requirement applies to the
126
states through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Requiring live witness testimony not only protects the accuracy of the
evidence presented to jurors, but it also “ensures a specific trial court
process that has unique social value, insisting, with limited
exceptions, upon the accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses in

constitutes a substantial deprivation”).
124
GOODE, supra note 116, at 341; see FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must
decide any preliminary question about whether . . . evidence is admissible. In so
deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.”).
125
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
126
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); BROUN, supra note 121, at 434.
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127

court.”
At common law, if a witness was unavailable to testify in
court, and if the defendant did not have a meaningful opportunity to
cross-examine the witness’s statements, then that witness’s prior
128
statements were inadmissible unless one of two exceptions applied.
The first was declarations made by a speaker “on the brink of death
129
and aware that he was dying,” and the second was forfeiture by
130
wrongdoing.
While the right of confrontation was included in the Bill of
Rights as a protection for criminal defendants, it was never
understood to be absolute: forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception
131
to the right to confrontation is rooted in English common law,
specifically a 1666 case wherein the fact that the witness was “detained
by the means or procurement of the prisoner” constituted a basis on
132
which to admit the witness’s prior testimony.
By the time of the
Founding, forfeiture by wrongdoing was one “species of
unavailability,” such as death and inability to travel, which were
133
grounds on which to admit prior formal statements.
The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing is not based on
principles of agency or waiver, but equity: a man shall not profit from
134
his wrongdoing. Application of forfeiture by wrongdoing does not
127

ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 414 (3d ed. 2004).
128
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358 (2008).
129
Id.
130
Id. at 359. Note that the common law rules were codified in FED. R. EVID.
804(b), discussed supra note 115.
131
Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (referencing Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771
(H.L. 1666)); Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 833, 851 (H.L.1692); Queen v. Scaife,
117 Q.B. 238, 242, 117 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1273 (Q.B. 1851); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown 425 (4th ed. 1762); T. PEAKE, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 62 (2d ed.
1804); 1 G. GILBERT, LAW OF EVIDENCE 214 (1791)).
132
Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (quoting Lord Morley’s Case, at which judges concluded
that a witness’s having been “detained by the means or procurement of the prisoner”
provided a basis to read testimony previously given at a coroner’s inquest. 6 How. St.
Tr., at 770–71).
133
Rebecca Sims Talbott, Note, What Remains of the “Forfeited” Right to
Confrontation? Restoring Sixth Amendment Values to the Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing Rule in
Light of Crawford v. Washington and Giles v. California, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1291, 1310–
11 (2010).
134
Giles, 554 U.S. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that in the case of
a defendant who murdered an adverse witness, “[e]quity demands” a “showing [of]
intent to prevent the witness from testifying” and that the majority opinion supplies
the conclusion that “equity requires”); id. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The
inequity consists of [Giles] being able to use the killing to keep out of court her
statements against him. That inequity exists whether the defendant’s state of mind is
purposeful, intentional (i.e., with knowledge), or simply probabilistic.”); PARK, supra
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require a defendant to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to
confrontation; rather, “the Rule withdraws the right” in response to
135
the defendant’s behavior.
A careful analysis of forfeiture by wrongdoing as a common law
exception to the right of confrontation—and of the Supreme Court’s
recent treatment of forfeiture as such—suggests that its use as a basis
136
to admit the prior statements of witnesses silenced by a defendant’s
gang associates is constitutional, not barred by relevant Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and in harmony with the equitable spirit of the
doctrine.
3.

The Relationship Between the Evidentiary and
Constitutional Bars

While the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing (as either an
evidentiary or constitutional exception) may appear straight-forward,
the requisite analysis is not. The Supreme Court recently held that,
for purposes of a criminal defendant’s constitutional confrontation
rights, hearsay proffered by the prosecution comprises two subsets:
137
“testimonial” statements and “non-testimonial” statements.
Nontestimonial statements are subject only to rules of evidence, so
movants need only overcome the hearsay rule and other evidentiary
hurdles to admit a non-testimonial statement. A showing that the
defendant “acquiesced” in making the witness unavailable satisfies the
138
federal forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception.
Defendants
are protected from the admission of prior testimonial statements,
139
however, by the Confrontation Clause. Forfeiture by wrongdoing is
an exception to the constitutional right of confrontation. The
Supreme Court stated in Reynolds v. United States, the case in which it
first recognized forfeiture by wrongdoing, that:
[t]he constitutional right of a prisoner to confront the
note 127, at 378 (“The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception arises not “from a belief
that such statements are reliable, but rather from an equitable principle that parties
should not be able to benefit from the absence of a declarant whom they made
unavailable.”).
135
PARK, supra note 127, at 378.
136
Both “non-testimonial” and “testimonial.”
137
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–53 (2004). I will omit quotation
marks throughout the remainder of this note, but see note 12 supra regarding the
Supreme Court’s usage of the word “testimonial.”
138
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); see, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 964
(7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “acquiescence itself is an act” and adopting the
dictionary definition of “acquiescence”: “to accept or comply passively or tacitly”).
139
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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witness and cross-examine him is not to be abrogated,
unless it be shown that the witness is dead, or out of the
jurisdiction of the court; or that having been summoned, he
appears to have been kept away by the adverse party on the
140
trial.
The Reynolds court thus recognized forfeiture by wrongdoing as an
exception to the right of confrontation where the defendant engaged
141
in “wrongful conduct designed to prevent a witness’s testimony.”
Until recently, the Supreme Court required only that an out-ofcourt statement by an unavailable declarant bore “adequate ‘indicia
of reliability’” stemming from a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” for its admission to
142
pass constitutional muster.
The effect was that satisfaction of the
hearsay rules generally indicated that the Confrontation Clause
143
requirements were satisfied. In 2004, however, the Supreme Court
dispensed with the “indicia of reliability” scheme when it decided
144
Observing that the Confrontation Clause
Crawford v. Washington.
was intended to combat the use of ex parte examinations in favor of
English common law’s preferred practice of live testimony in an
145
adversarial process, the Court held, after an historical analysis, that
lower courts should employ a categorical framework: testimonial
statements may be “admitted only where the declarant is unavailable,
and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross146
examine.”
Conversely, non-testimonial statements by an out-ofcourt witness are no longer subject to Confrontation Clause exclusion
147
at all.
The Court interpreted the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
148
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him” to apply only to

140

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1878) (emphasis omitted); see
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366 (2008) (explaining Reynolds is first case in which
the Supreme Court recognized forfeiture by wrongdoing).
141
Giles, 554 U.S. at 366.
142
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
143
Park, supra note 127, at 415.
144
See generally 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
145
BROUN, supra note 121, at 437.
146
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
147
Id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with
the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay
law . . . .”).
148
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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149

“those who ‘bear testimony,’” which meant, historically, to make a
150
“solemn declaration.” The Court set forth a new “primary purpose”
test to determine whether a statement is testimonial, explaining
“[w]ithout attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all
conceivable statements” that testimonial statements are those made
with the intent to establish facts relevant to a future prosecution
151
when there is no ongoing emergency.
In contrast, the Court
defined non-testimonial statements as those made “under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
152
emergency.” So, in accordance with the Court’s interpretation, the
right of confrontation requires that testimonial statements—those
made outside of emergency circumstances and that establish facts
153
relevant to future prosecution —are inadmissible unless offered by
the declarant’s live testimony or unless an exception, like forfeiture
by wrongdoing, applies.
B. Giles v. California’s Limited Scope Does Not Encompass Gangperpetrated Witness Intimidation
The Supreme Court most recently treated forfeiture by
154
wrongdoing in Giles v. California, in which the Court set forth an
149

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
Id. (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828)).
151
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (Testimonial statements
include those “taken by police officers in the course of interrogation . . . when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68
(explaining that statements made in a police interrogation are testimonial, as in the
facts of Crawford, as well as those made at a preliminary hearing, a grand jury, or a
former trial).
152
Davis, 574 U.S. at 822; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 56 (including in its description
of non-testimonial statements “an off-hand, overheard remark,” “a casual remark to
an acquaintance,” and “business records or statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy”).
153
See supra note 151 and accompanying text. For specific applications of the test
set forth in Crawford by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.
2221 (2012) (expert testimony declaring a DNA profile matches other evidence);
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (victim’s statements to police);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011) (blood-alcohol analysis report
admitted through testimony of non-testing, non-certifying analyst); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (government analysts’ certificates of analysis
identifying substance); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (statements made
during police interrogation conducted during emergency).
154
554 U.S. 353 (2008).
150
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155

intent requirement grounded in the right to confront adverse
witnesses. Prior to Giles, two distinct lines of cases had developed
156
In the first
concerning the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
line, courts required that the prosecution prove that the defendant
performed some act with the specific intent to render a particular
witness unavailable at trial in order to invoke the exception, while, in
the other, the courts were willing to admit the statements even where
157
proof of specific intent was lacking.
The Supreme Court in Giles
approved the former approach in a case where the defendant was on
158
trial for murdering the declarant.
A “specific intent” requirement may seem, at first glance, to
foreclose the application of forfeiture by wrongdoing to testimonial
statements by witnesses who are unavailable due to the action of a
defendant’s gang because evidence of the defendant’s intent to
silence an adverse witness (such as, for example, a recorded phone
conversation during which the defendant instructs his cohorts to kill
the witness to eliminate her testimony) is usually prohibitively
difficult to obtain. A close reading of Giles, however, reveals that the
specific intent requirement may not apply to gang-perpetrated
witness intimidation at all.
1.

Facts & Procedural History

In Giles v. California, Dwayne Giles was tried and convicted for
159
the murder of his girlfriend, Avie.
During trial, the prosecution
offered and the trial court admitted statements Avie had made to her
sister describing how Giles harmed her, including by choking and

155

Id. at 367 (“[T]he exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the
particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). For more on specific intent, see infra note 198.
156
Marc McAllister, Down But Not Out: Why Giles Leaves Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
Still Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 393, 397 (2009).
157
Id. For courts that did not, prior to Giles, require specific intent to silence a
witness as a predicate to forfeiture by wrongdoing, see, e.g., United States v. GarciaMeza, 403 F.3d 364, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d
961, 967–68 (S.D. Ohio 2005); State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 793–95 (Kan. 2004),
overruled in part by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317 (Kan. 2006); State v. Jensen, 727
N.W.2d 518, 534 (Wis. 2007). For courts that did, prior to Giles, require a showing of
specific intent, see, e.g., People v. Moreno, 160 P.3d 242, 245–46 (Colo. 2007);
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass. 2005); State v. Romero, 133
P.3d 842, 855–56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007).
158
See generally Giles, 544 U.S. 353 (2008); e.g., Hunt v. State, 218 P.3d 516, 518
(Okla. Crim. App. 2009).
159
Giles, 544 U.S. at 357.
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160

hitting her.
While the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court
161
Subsequently, Giles argued that his right to
decided Crawford.
confrontation had been violated by the admission of Avie’s
162
statements, which were unconfronted.
The California Court of
163
Appeal and the California Supreme Court upheld the conviction,
164
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
After assuming that the statements of Avie in question were
165
testimonial, the Supreme Court, in its main opinion, “ask[ed]
whether the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing accepted by the
California Supreme Court is a founding-era exception to the
166
confrontation right.” It summarized the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court as follows: “Giles had forfeited his right to confront
Avie because he had committed the murder for which he was on trial,
and because his intentional criminal act made Avie unavailable to
167
testify.”
The Supreme Court ultimately disapproved of this
reasoning and opined that Avie’s prior statements should not have
been admitted into evidence without a showing that the defendant
168
specifically intended to prevent her in-court testimony.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a decision
169
consistent with its opinion.
160

Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
162
See id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Giles, 544 U.S. at 358.
166
Id. at 358. The majority opinion also states in its introduction that it will
“consider” the broader question of “whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth
Amendment right to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a
wrongful act by the defendant made the witness unavailable to testify at trial.” Id. at
355.
167
Id. at 357. This framing of the certified question is similar to the question as
characterized in the parties’ briefs. The Petitioner posed the question: “[d]oes a
criminal defendant ‘forfeit’ his or her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
claims upon a mere showing that the defendant has caused the unavailability of a
witness, as some courts have held, or must there also be an additional showing that
the defendant’s actions were undertaken for the purpose of preventing the witness
from testifying, as other courts have held?” Giles v. California, 544 U.S. 353, Brief of
Petitioner i, Feb. 20, 2008, 2008 WL 494948. The State of California characterized
the question on appeal as “[w]hether a defendant who murders a witness may
complain that the witness is unavailable for cross-examination.” Giles v. California,
544 U.S. 353, Respondent’s Brief on the Merits i, March 19, 2008, 2008 WL 904073.
168
Giles, 554 U.S. at 377.
169
Id. On remand, the California Court of Appeals found that Avie’s statements
were testimonial and the prosecution failed to present evidence that Giles killed her
with the “intent to prevent her from testifying or cooperating in a criminal
161
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Splintered Supreme Court opinions seem increasingly common,
and Giles is no exception. Justice Scalia wrote for a fractured
majority. He was joined in full by Justices Thomas and Alito (each
filed separate concurrences) and in part by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg (Justice Ginsburg joined a concurrence by Justice Souter).
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, dissented.
The result is five separate opinions, three of which are
170
concurrences.
Justice Scalia’s opinion is in this Comment termed
the “main opinion” because the preponderance of it claims the
support of a majority (six justices), while one portion of it, part D-2,
claims the support of a plurality (four justices). With a bench so
riven, determining which of its statements are binding declarations
and which are dicta is no simple feat.
3.

The Holding Controls Only When Defendants Are on
Trial for Murdering the Declarant

Following a recapitulation the facts and procedural history of
the case, Scalia, author of the main opinion in Giles, quickly
dispensed with the dying declaration doctrine as inapplicable to the
171
facts.
He next stated that forfeiture by wrongdoing is a second
common law exception to the right of confrontation recognized by
172
the Supreme Court and commenced an examination of the words
and definitions used to define forfeiture by wrongdoing at common
173
Scalia, citing various English cases, observed that “the terms
law.
used to define the scope of the forfeiture rule suggest that the
exception applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct

investigation.” People v. Giles, No. B166937, 2009 WL 457832 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25,
2009). Upon retrial, Giles was convicted of first degree murder. People v. Giles,
B224629, 2012 WL 130659, 1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012), unpublished/noncitable
(Jan. 18, 2012), review denied (Apr. 11, 2012), reh’g denied (Feb. 17, 2012).
170
In their concurrences, Justices Thomas and Alito each concurred fully in the
reasoning of the opinion as it pertains to the application of forfeiture by
wrongdoing. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377–78. They wrote separately to emphasize their view
that Avie’s statements were outside the ambit of the Confrontation Clause. Id.
171
Id. at 358–59 (noting that the statements in question were not made under
belief of impending death).
172
Id.
173
The dissent accepts this method of analysis to determine the scope of the
exception at the time of the Founding but reaches a different conclusion. Giles, 554
U.S. at 381–83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Like the majority, I believe it is important to
recognize the relevant history . . . . The remaining question concerns the precise
metes and bounds of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.”).
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174

designed to prevent the witness from testifying.”
Scalia concluded
that “[t]he manner in which the rule was applied makes plain that
unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing
175
that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying.”
Next addressing U.S. post-Founding precedent, Scalia observed that
Reynolds was “never” invoked in murder prosecutions to support
176
admission of a victim’s prior inculpatory statements, and the
Reynolds holding relied upon the common law precedent set forth in
177
the main Giles opinion as well as the equitable roots of the doctrine.
Scalia noted that the earliest case identified by the parties and amici
wherein the unconfronted statements of a declarant-victim were
admitted against a defendant-attacker via forfeiture by wrongdoing
was decided as recently as 1985 (there, the defendant was convicted

174

Giles, 554 U.S. at 359–60.
These include “means,” “contrivance,”
“procurement,” etc.
175
Id. at 361. According to Scalia, the forfeiture exception did not apply where a
defendant merely caused the absence without doing so to prevent testimony. Scalia
noted that, where defendants were charged with the death of the declarant,
forfeiture was not argued by lawyers who either had precarious proof of a dying
declaration or were patently unable to prove a dying declaration. Id. at 362, 364.
Moreover, he noted that cases in which the dying declaration exception did apply
still lacked theories of forfeiture, which (if causation were sufficient) could be shown
simply by putting on the case in chief. Id. at 364. As noted in the opinion, the State
of California argued that, in those cases, the commission of wrongdoing caused the
forfeiture of confrontation rights, not of hearsay rights. Id. at 364–65. Scalia
countered by arguing that no treatise supports the State’s view, and it would be
“surprising” if correct because, at common law, courts excluded hearsay “because it
was unconfronted,” id. at 365, suggesting that a defendant who forfeited his
confrontation rights would not enjoy the benefit of the hearsay rule.
176
Giles, 544 U.S. at 367. In Reynolds v. United States, a defendant kept his wife
away from authorities, rendering her unavailable, so her prior statements were
admitted in her absence. 98 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1878). The Supreme Court, in
affirming the trial court’s decision, invoked forfeiture by wrongdoing as an exception
to confrontation. Id. at 158 (explaining that “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee
an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own wrongful acts”).
In doing so, it purported to adopt a rule of “long-established usage” which “is the
outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common honesty.” Id. at 159. The
court relied on common law cases including Lord Morley’s Case (6 State Trials, 770)
(1666) (resolving that “if their lordships were satisfied by the evidence they had
heard that the witness was detained by means or procurement of the prisoner, then
the [prior] examination [of the witness] might be read”); Harrison’s Case, and Regina
v. Scaife (17 Ad. & El. N.S. 242) (“all the judges agreed that if the prisoner had
resorted to a contrivance to keep a witness out of the way, the deposition of the
witness, taken before a magistrate and in the presence of the prisoner, might be
read.”).
177
Giles, 554 U.S. at 366–67 (explaining that the Reynolds court relied on
equitable maxims and cited the leading common-law cases).
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178

of the murder of the declarant), and the Supreme Court has never
179
recognized such an application of the doctrine.
The main opinion concludes that the exception that the
California court endorsed—forfeiture of confrontation rights where
the alleged murderer killed a declarant-victim without specific intent
to silence the victim—is not an exception to the Confrontation
180
Clause.
The main opinion contains a summary of the majority’s
rationales. It designates as “highly persuasive” (1) “the most natural
reading of the common law,” (2) the absence of common-law cases
admitting prior statements on a forfeiture theory when the defendant
had not engaged in conduct designed to prevent a witness from
testifying,” and (3) “a subsequent history in which the dissent’s broad
181
forfeiture theory has not been applied.”
It then designates as
“conclusive . . . the common law’s uniform exclusion of unconfronted
inculpatory testimony by murder victims . . . in the innumerable cases in
which the defendant was on trial for killing the victim, but was not shown
182
to have done so for the purpose of preventing testimony.”
This
183
ultimate rationale is as narrow as the question originally presented
and suggests that the Court’s holdingrequiring specific intent by
the defendant to silence the witness—controls only a subset of cases:
those in which the defendant is on trial for the murder of the
declarant.
The focus of the main opinion is almost exclusively on cases
wherein the defendant is on trial for the murder of a victim,
admission of whose statements are sought by means other than
forfeiture by wrongdoing or denied under a theory of forfeiture by
184
wrongdoing. The Court does reference cases wherein third parties
178

Giles, 455 U.S. at 367 (citing United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983 (1985)).
Id.
180
Id. at 368.
181
Id.
182
Id. (emphasis added).
183
See supra notes 166 & 167 and accompanying text.
184
See Smith v. State, 28 Tenn. 9, 23 (1848) (statements of victim inadmissible as
forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore excluded); Lewis v. State, 17 Miss. 115, 120
(1847) (statements of victim inadmissible as forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore
excluded); Nelson v. State, 26 Tenn. 542, 543 (1847) (statements of victim
inadmissible as forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore excluded); Montgomery v.
State, 11 Ohio 424, 425–26 (1842) (statements of victim inadmissible as forfeiture by
wrongdoing and therefore excluded); United States v. Woods, 28 F. Cas. 762, 763 (No.
16,760) (C.C. D.C. 1834) (statements of victim inadmissible as forfeiture by
wrongdoing and therefore excluded); King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 78 (Gen. Ct.
1817) (admission of victim’s statements sought only on dying declaration basis);
Gibson v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. 111 (Gen. Ct. 1817) (admission of victim’s
179
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silence a witness on a defendant’s behalf—in those cases, forfeiture is
185
invoked successfully.
186
joined by Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Souter’s concurrence,
similarly indicates the narrow scope of Giles. Souter agreed that
Scalia’s “historical analysis is sound” but noted that Justice Breyer, in
dissent, engaged in a similar methodology and reached a different
187
result. The “contrast” of Scalia and Breyer’s “careful examinations
of the historical record” persuaded Souter that the record is
188
inconclusive.
Unlike the main opinion, the reasoning of this
critical concurrence (which speaks for two of the six majority votes)
rests on the “rationale” that “equity demands” a specific intent
requirement to avoid the “near circularity” that results where a judge
presiding over a murder trial may find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a defendant is guilty of the murder of a declarant
before a jury finds that same defendant guilty of that same murder
189
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In other words, the “rationale” that
“persuades [Souter, and presumably Ginsburg also,] that the Court’s
190
conclusion is the right one” is one that only makes sense in cases
where a defendant is on trial for the murder of a declarant, and it is a
statements sought only on dying declaration basis); Anthony v. State, 19 Tenn. 265
(1838) (admission of victim’s statements sought only on dying declaration basis);
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791) (unconfronted statements of
victim inadmissible as dying declarations, under Marian statute, and as best evidence
and therefore excluded); Thomas John’s Case, 1 East 357, 358 (P.C. 1790)
(statements of victim inadmissible as forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore
excluded); Welbourn’s Case, 1 East 358, 360 (P.C. 1792) (statements of victim
inadmissible as forfeiture by wrongdoing and therefore excluded); King v.
Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (1789) (unconfronted statements of
victim admitted as dying declaration but inadmissible under Marian statute).
185
Rex v. Barber, 1 Root 76 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1775) (admitting hearsay
evidencing statements of a witness who had previously testified against the defendant
but was “sent away” by a friend of the defendant, “and by his instigation,” prior to
testifying before the petit-jury); Harrison’s Case, 12 How. St. Tr., at 851 (hearsay
admitted where “[a]n agent of the defendant had attempted to bribe [the
declarant], who later disappeared under mysterious circumstances”: “Mr. Harrison’s
agents or friends . . . made or conveyed away a young man that was a principal
evidence against him”) (cited in Giles, 554 U.S. at 370).
186
See generally Giles, 554 U.S. 353, 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring).
187
Id. (“The contrast between the Court’s and Justice Breyer’s careful
examinations of the historical record tells me that the early cases on the exception
were not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here.”).
188
Justice Breyer seemed to agree, id. at 396 (“I also recognize the possibility that
there are too few old records available for us to draw firm conclusions.”), rendering a
majority of the court in agreement that the historical record is inconclusive.
189
Giles, 554 U.S. at 379.
190
Id. at 380.
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prior testimonial statement of that declarant that the prosecution
seeks to admit through forfeiture by wrongdoing. This rationale, the
outcome of which requires a showing of specific intent as a matter of
constitutional law, simply cannot apply to situations wherein a gang,
acting on behalf of a gang member-defendant, silences a witness to
his crime because the defendant is not on trial for the witness’s
murder: no such “near circularity” would result.
Where there is a set of fractured opinions that do not reflect a
coherent majority statement of legal doctrine, it is appropriate to
treat the holding as the narrowest principle that supports the
191
outcome on the facts. In this case, the facts are that the defendant,
Giles, was on trial for the murder of the declarant, Avie, whose
testimonial statements were admitted without a showing that Giles
murdered Avie with the specific intent to silence her. The narrowest
ground shared by the main and concurring opinions that is necessary
to support the outcome of the decisionthe requirement of specific
intentis that such specific intent is a necessary requisite only where
the defendant is on trial for the declarant’s murder.
In short, Scalia, joined by Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice
Roberts, asserted that the common law allowed forfeiture only where
there was specific intent to tamper with witnesses. Souter, joined by
Ginsburg, was not fully persuaded by the historical record but
nonetheless concurred on the basis of a policy rationale, opining that
equity would doubtlessly abhor forfeiture where a judge deems a
murder defendant guilty by a preponderance standard before a jury
has the chance to agree beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of this,
the holding of Giles is reasonably stated as follows: if the defendant is
on trial for the murder of a declarant whose unconfronted
testimonial statements the prosecution seeks to admit, then the
prosecution must show the defendant committed murder with the
specific intent to prevent the victim from testifying. Given this
narrow scope, Giles does not directly apply to those cases wherein
gang members take it upon themselves to silence witnesses to gang
crime pursuant to a “no snitching” policy on behalf of a defendant.
The holding only applies to cases in which the prosecution seeks to
use forfeiture by wrongdoing to admit the statements of a victim
whose alleged murderer is on trial for that crime. In all other cases,
the necessity of specific intent to silence a particular witness is yet to
be determined, and there are good arguments for why the specific
191

See generally Tristan C. Pelham-Webb, Powelling for Precedent: “Binding”
Concurrences, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 693, 695–96 (2009).
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intent requirement should not apply in the gang cases just described.
C. Even if Giles is Applied to Cases of Gang-perpetrated Witness
Intimidation, a Three-part Test Should be Used for Application of
Forfeiture by Wrongdoing.
The question remains: what standard will satisfy the
constitutional demands of the Confrontation Clause and the
equitable demands of forfeiture by wrongdoing in the case of gangperpetrated witness tampering? In Giles, the dissent and majority
differed over the question of whether a “knowledge” standard—that
is, knowledge by the defendant that the witness would be unable to
testify because of the defendant’s act of killing her—should suffice
(as the dissent argued) or whether “specific intent to silence” must be
proved (as a majority held). The main concern shared by a majority
of the court in Giles was that, without the specific intent requirement,
192
a judge may on his own find a defendant “guilty as charged.” This
concern is not present in the typical case of gang-perpetrated witness
intimidation because the defendant is not typically on trial for
making a witness unavailable, but for committing some other crime
about which the witness had material information. Nonetheless, even
if the Supreme Court requires “specific intent” to be shown in such
cases, the main opinion did not define what suffices to demonstrate a
sufficient showing of specific intent in all cases. It mentioned a
consensus among commentators that “intent” is “the particular
193
purpose of making the witness unavailable,” and it decried the
194
dissent’s claim that “knowledge is sufficient to show intent.” In the
case of gang-perpetrated witness intimidation, if a gang memberdefendant sees his gang protect other members through witness
intimidation yet remains an active gang member, then, assuming he
benefits from that enforcement policy when adverse witnesses in his
trial are so silenced, his specific intent may be shown by a

192

See Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 (Scalia, J.) (“The notion that judges may strip the
defendant of a right that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis
of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit well
with the right to trial by jury.”); id., at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (“If the
victim’s prior statement were admissible solely because the defendant kept the
witness out of court by committing homicide, admissibility of the victim’s statement
to prove guilt would turn on finding the defendant guilty of the homicidal act
causing the absence; evidence that the defendant killed would come in because the
defendant probably killed.”).
193
Id. at 367 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194
Id. at 368.

MCDONOUGH (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

10/22/2013 2:23 PM

COMMENT

1315

195

preponderance of the evidence.
The “knowledge” versus “intent”
debate in Giles was, arguably, about a distinction without a practical
difference because in many cases the same evidence would be offered
196
(and sufficient) to prove either knowledge or intent.
Similarly,
195

Recall Wigmore’s “doctrine of chances” as a means to prove intent, which he
explained as “the instinctive recognition of that logical process which eliminates the
element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is
perceived that this element cannot explain them all.” JOHN H. WIGMORE, THE
PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF AS GIVEN BY LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, AND GENERAL
EXPERIENCE AND ILLUSTRATED IN JUDICIAL TRIALS 133 (Little, Brown, and Co. 1913).
By way of example, he described two hunters in the woods, with hunter A walking
ahead of hunter B. Id. If hunter A hears a bullet whistle past his head once, he is
willing to assume hunter B accidently pulled the trigger or aimed poorly. Id. But if,
soon after, a second bullet goes by, and then a third, which strikes him, hunter A may
well assume hunter B intended the shot [to do what?]. Id.
196
In recognizing the challenge of proving specific intent, specifically in
domestic violence scenarios, the Court sanctioned allowing an “inference of intent”
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, even though none may
directly bear on the state of mind of the defendant in the culminating act of abuse.
Justice Scalia in the main opinion said that intent may be inferred in the case of an
abuser who kills his victim if there is a history of abuse and intimidation intended to
prevent his victim from seeking assistance or testifying against him. Giles, 554 U.S. at
377. His oft-cited treatment of domestic violence states outright that intent can be
inferred from a history of violence and intimidation:
Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim from
resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent
testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecutions.
Where such an abusive relationship culminates in murder, the
evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to
isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the
authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her
prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Earlier
abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade the victim from
resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to this inquiry, as
would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim
would have been expected to testify.
Id. In short, Justice Scalia acknowledged that in the case of domestic violence,
evidence of a history of abuse or threats of abuse by the abuser is relevant to whether
the act of killing his victim was intended to silence her. Id.
Justice Souter agreed that a history of domestic abuse or threats intended to
dissuade a victim from speaking to authorities can give rise to an inference that, in
the alleged murder, the defendant intended to silence the witness, even if there is no
evidence of the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the murder. E.g., id. at 380
(Souter, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Souter observed that a historical
examination reveals a dearth of “any reason to doubt that the element of intention
would normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the domestic abuser
in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the victim from outside
help, including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial process.” Id. In other
words, a history of isolation from law enforcement imposed by the abusive defendant
can give rise to the inference of specific intent to prevent testimony. Justice Souter
made the case by suggesting that “[i]f the evidence for admissibility shows a
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whether a knowledge- or intent-based standard is applied to gangperpetrated witness intimidation, the test ought not to involve such
specificity as to require that the defendant knew of and intended
particular acts against a particular witness. Instead, “wrongdoing”
ought to be provable by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant (1) joined or remained a member of a gang, (2) with
knowledge that the gang silences witnesses by intimidation or
retaliation, and (3) members of the defendant’s gang caused the
unavailability of a declarant. In such a case, the gang memberdefendant should forfeit his right to confront that declarant.
197
198
Direct evidence of intent is rarely available, so circumstantial
evidence is generally relied upon in proving intent. In gang cases,
circumstantial evidence of intent to silence witnesses would include
evidence supporting the defendant’s voluntary entrance and
continued membership in a gang plus evidence supporting the
defendant’s knowledge that the gang intimidates witnesses. The
prosecution may call on a variety of sources for the necessary proof,
continuing relationship of this sort, it would make no sense to suggest that the
oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant
before he killed his victim, say, in a fit of anger.” Id. at 380.
While Scalia emphasizes that the standard is not “knowledge-based intent,” he
suggests that the treatment of domestic violence should be the same under Giles as
any other serious crime. Id. at 376 (“In any event, we are puzzled by the dissent’s
decision to devote its peroration to domestic abuse cases. Is the suggestion that we
should have one Confrontation Clause (the one the Framers adopted and Crawford
described) for all other crimes, but a special, improvised, Confrontation Clause for
those crimes that are frequently directed against women? Domestic violence is an
intolerable offense that legislatures may choose to combat through many meansfrom increasing criminal penalties to adding resources for investigation and
prosecution to funding awareness and prevention campaigns. But for that serious
crime, as for others, abridging the constitutional rights of criminal defendants is not
in the State’s arsenal.”).
197
Direct evidence is defined as “[p]roof which speaks directly to the issue,
requiring no support by other evidence; proof in testimony out of the witness’ own
knowledge, as distinguished from evidence of circumstances from which inferences
must be drawn if it is to have probative effect.” BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY
(2010).
198
Intent is generally divided into two categories: “general intent” and “specific
intent.” Historically, “specific intent” meant a “particular mental state” expressly
required by the offense, as opposed to “general intent,” which meant the
“blameworthy state of mind” required for most offenses that did not otherwise
require a specified mens rea. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 138
(6th ed., LexisNexis 2012). Today, “specific intent” can mean the purpose of causing
“the social harm set out in the definition of the offense.” Alternatively, “specific
intent” may mean (1) the “purpose to do some future act, or to achieve some further
consequence . . . beyond the conduct or result that constitutes the actus reus of the
offense”; or (2) the state of being “aware of a statutory attendant circumstance.” Id.
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including former gang members, incarcerated gang members and
other cooperating witnesses, confidential informants, innocent
observers, police officers, and gang experts to testify that the gang has
intimidated witnesses in the past, that it does so as a regular practice,
that the defendant was a member of the gang, and that he would
199
have known about the intimidation tactics employed by the gang.
Thisin conjunction with evidence supporting the finding that a
declarant was made unavailable to testify by intimidation, threats of
retaliation, or physical harm perpetrated by gang associates of the
defendantshows not only knowledge of the intimidation by the
defendant, but also an expectation that it would occur, giving rise to
an inference of intent sufficiently specific to satisfy any reasonable
construction of Giles.
Suppose person A enters into an arrangement with friend B
such that if A commits a crime in the future and is caught, friend B
agrees to unilaterally and without further consultation take measures,
including such witness tampering as may be necessary, up to and
including murder, to prevent A’s conviction. Suppose then that A
commits a crime, and a single witness, whose existence and identity is
unknown to A, makes an incriminating statement to the police.
Finally, suppose that before the witness is called to testify in court, B
kills the witness, and that the agreement can be proved
circumstantially before A is tried.
In this hypothetical and absent evidence to the contrary,
defendant A must be said to have at least “acquiesced” in the
wrongful act of silencing the witness, even though he himself never
knew the particular witness’s name, or even his existence as a witness.
This would satisfy the hearsay hurdle set forth in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Evidence of the pre-arrangement proves that the
defendant had knowledge that the witness was in danger of being
forcefully silenced, since the defendant could not be prosecuted
without some witness, even though the defendant did not know the
name of the witness or his particular testimony. And, even applying
199

If she is alive, willing, and able, the prosecution may even call the unavailable
witness herself, who, although unwilling to testify as to the commission of the
underlying crime in open court, may be willing to testify at a 104(a) hearing as to
why she is unavailable and other pertinent information about the defendant’s gang
activities to which she is privy. Additionally, if the prosecution has in custody the
gang members who actually acted to make the declarant unavailable, it might
consider bargaining with them to testify in exchange for leniency. This, of course, is
a difficult decision for a prosecutor, who may not be willing to make a deal with gang
members who tampered with, intimidated, or even killed a witness.
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some form of specific intent requirement, there is little doubt that
sufficiently specific intent to tamper with a witness exists even though
the defendant did not instruct the friend to kill the witness, or tell the
friend after the defendant was charged to do anything; it is
reasonable to infer from evidence of such a pre-arrangement that A
expects that should he commit a crime, he will benefit from the
wrongdoing of friend B.
Similarly, forfeiture by wrongdoing is applicable to a scenario in
which a gang member-defendant’s associates tamper with witnesses to
the defendant’s crime. Suppose the following: X joined a gang and
subsequently learned that during his tenure as a member, gang
members repeatedly beat up witnesses to crimes committed by other
members, causing those witnesses to recant their inculpatory
statements made to police. This knowledge reasonably gives rise to
X’s belief that his fellow gang members would be willing to intimidate
witnesses on his behalf, if the occasion arose. Suppose X committed
armed robbery of a convenience store, murdering the cashier but
inadvertently leaving unharmed a young boy hidden in the back
room who saw the entire crime unfold. Suppose the boy was the only
eyewitness able to describe the crime and identify X, who was taken
into custody and charged based solely on the young boy’s statements
made to authorities in the days following the crime. Now, suppose
that, in an overt act of witness tampering, X’s gang associates take it
upon themselves—without X’s knowledge—to murder the young boy
before the trial.
In this gruesome scenario, the prosecution would be left without
a case—and justice undone—unless an exception to the hearsay rule
and the Confrontation Clause permitted the admission of the boy’s
statements in his absence. The criteria of forfeiture by wrongdoing—
which only need be proved by a preponderance of the evidence—is
met here: the defendant’s wrongful conduct was to join and remain an
active member of a gang knowing it enforced a “no snitching” policy
and expecting to benefit from such enforcement should the occasion
arise; his continued membership caused his fellow gang members to
enforce the policy on his behalf; and, of course, he would profit from
the tampering that he expected the other members of his gang to
undertake because the only eyewitness to his crime is now dead.
Even if Giles controls, proof of these elements would surpass what is
necessary to meet a knowledge-based standard and give rise to an
inference of intent by a preponderance of the evidence.
It is possible that an individual defendant specifically intends
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that his gang associates do not undertake to silence a witness, perhaps
for moral reasons, to prevent harm to the particular witness, or for
any other reason. In that case, forfeiture should not apply, even if
the gang associates tamper with and successfully silence the witness.
This Comment proposes a standard that is a sufficient safeguard
against such inequitable forfeiture. Evidence giving rise to an
inference of intent to silence the witness can be countered with
evidence such as testimony by the defendant or other witnesses that,
if believed, will render an inference of the requisite intent impossible.
In this way, the mere fact that the gang unilaterally tampered with or
killed a witness would not automatically subject the defendant to
forfeiture; rather, the prosecution must show evidence giving rise to
an inference of intent to silence witnesses, and the defendant would
have the opportunity to rebut the evidence if he so chose.
The standard suggested here puts the defendant at no greater
disadvantage than other doctrines that operate similarly. Most
notably, forfeiture by wrongdoing shares its method of proof with
200
conspiracy.
Like proving forfeiture by wrongdoing, proving that a
200

The co-conspirator exception to hearsay is an evidentiary rule that treats “a
statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of [a]
conspiracy” as an admission by a party-opponent. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
Forfeiture by wrongdoing and the co-conspirator exception to hearsay are
“analytically and functionally identical.” United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271,
1280 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180 (1st Cir.
1993), cert. denied 512 U.S. 1223 (1994)). They are similar in two ways: procedurally,
the requirements necessary to invoke forfeiture by wrongdoing and the coconspirator exception to hearsay are by and large the same, and substantively, they
are both doctrines that can involve an inference that a defendant is responsible for
the actions or words of another person. Both require a showing of specific intent,
and, for both, an affirmative finding can rest upon circumstantial evidence. The
same degree of evidentiary support that is sufficient to support a conspiracy for the
purposes of the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is applicable to forfeiture by
wrongdoing. These stark similarities suggest that a gang member-defendant who—in
the terminology of conspiracy—“consciously participated” in an organization with a
policy of enforcing a “no snitching” policy thereby forfeited his right to crossexamine any adverse witness silenced by his gang on his behalf.
To invoke forfeiture by wrongdoing, the proponent must show that the
declarant is unavailable due to wrongdoing that the defendant procured or to which
he acquiesced, by, in most circuits, a preponderance of the evidence. See Cotto v.
Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 235 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1028
(11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 77 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000); see
also Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying preponderance
standard for preliminary findings in forfeiture by misconduct cases). If testimonial
statements are in question, the proponent must also show that the defendant
possessed specific intent to silence the declarant. The proponent of a coconspirator’s statement under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) must show that a
conspiracy existed, the declarant and the defendant were both parties to the
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defendant is party to a conspiracy requires a showing of specific
201
Circumstantial evidence can give rise to a defendant’s
intent.
“conscious participation” in a conspiracy, even if the defendant
merely “had some idea of its criminal objectives” without knowing all
the details of the crimes involved or the existence of other co202
conspirators.
Neither knowledge of a conspiracy, nor association
with conspirators, nor the defendant’s presence at the scene of a
criminal act can alone constitute sufficient evidence of intent to
203
participate in the conspiracy, just as neither knowledge of witness
tampering nor membership in a gang can each alone constitute
sufficient evidence of intent to silence a witness. At the same time, a
person need not expressly agree to participate in a conspiracy to be a
204
guilty party to it—actions can imply consent. Further, knowledge of
conspiracy, and the declarant made the statement in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Houlihan, 92 F.3d at 1281. Like forfeiture by wrongdoing, all this must be shown
under Rule 104(a) by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
For both the co-conspirator exception and forfeiture by wrongdoing, the
threshold to meet the standard of proof is low, and direct evidence is not required,
both for practical as well as policy reasons. In the case of forfeiture of confrontation
rights:
[i]t seems almost certain that, in a case involving coercion or threats, a
witness who refuses to testify at trial will not testify to the actions
procuring his or her unavailability. It would not serve the goal of Rule
804(b)(6) to hold that circumstantial evidence cannot support a
finding of coercion. Were we to hold otherwise, defendants would
have a perverse incentive to cover up wrongdoing with still more
wrongdoing, to the loss of probative evidence at trial.
Scott, 284 F.3d at 764.
Similarly, the co-conspirator exception to hearsay is supported by both practical
and equitable rationales. Conspiracies tend to be clandestine in nature such that
criminal activity is difficult to prove, often rendering statements by co-conspirators
crucial evidence for the prosecution. RONALD J. ALLEN, ET AL, EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, AND CASES 484 (4th ed. 2006). Further, it is appropriate to burden a
conspirator with the “risk that false or inaccurate co-conspirators’ statements will be
used against that person” once it has been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that he participated in a criminal conspiracy. See id. Another rationale is
that co-conspirators are deemed to have authorized statements made by coconspirators, but it is largely an artificial explanation, id., that rests on principles of
agency, which are not implicated in the forfeiture by wrongdoing analysis.
201
Palmer v. People, 964 P.2d 524, 527 (Colo. 1998) (“The crime of conspiracy
requires two mental states . . . the specific intent to agree to commit a particular
crime . . . [and] the specific intent to cause the result of the crime that is the subject
of the agreement.”); Julia N. Sarnoff, Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
663, 671 (2011).
202
Sarnoff, supra note 201, at 671–72.
203
Id.
204
United States v. Klein, 515 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1975) (citing Direct Sales
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an ongoing conspiracy, while insufficient in itself to constitute intent,
205
can nonetheless serve as the basis for an inference of specific intent.
(In fact, some courts have gone further, allowing conspiracy to serve
as an underlying rationale for invocation of forfeiture by wrongdoing,
even where a defendant was not formally charged with a
206
conspiracy. ).
According to the Giles Court, without the forfeiture rule, there
would exist “an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe,
207
intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.”
This incentive
applies with particular force where gangs are involved. While
procedural safeguards such as permitting depositions and crossexamination by the defense prior to trial may help safeguard against
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709 (1943)); United States v. Lester, 282 F.2d 750,
753 (3d Cir. 1960).
205
Direct Sales Co., 319 U.S. at 711 (“Without the knowledge, the intent cannot
exist.”); Klein, 515 F.2d at 753 (“Knowledge of the illicit purpose will also serve as the
foundation for the required proof of specific intent.”).
206
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the question of whether forfeiture can be
enacted by the actions of another person. It held in the affirmative, establishing what
is now known as the Cherry doctrine. The Cherry doctrine relies on the assertion that
both the Confrontation Clause and evidence exceptions are met if “the wrongful
procurement was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a
necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy.” United States v.
Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000). Since then, some circuits have held that
“acquiescence” is co-extensive with co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton liability.
See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1948), for the purposes of forfeiture by
wrongdoing. See United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (adopting
the Cherry doctrine).
In Cherry, the court allowed forfeiture by wrongdoing even while admitting that
there was “absolutely no evidence [the defendant] had actual knowledge of, agreed
to or participated in the murder of” the declarant. Cherry 217 F.3d at 814 (quoting
United States v. Price, No. CR-98-10-S, order at 17 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 1999). It
reasoned that the requirements of conspiracy were met because it was reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant that his co-conspirator might silence the witness in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 820 (holding that a defendant waives his
hearsay objection and confrontation rights if the wrongful procurement of a
witness’s silence “was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as
a necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy”). Similar to the
inference of intent to silence in domestic violence murders, the court in Cherry stated
that imputed waiver of confrontation rights under the Cherry doctrine may be used to
admit hearsay even though the defendant is not convicted of the underlying crime.
This is because the standard for showing forfeiture by wrongdoing is preponderance
of the evidence, while the standard for conviction of the substantive offense is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, a prosecutor need not even charge a
defendant with a conspiracy in order to utilize the Cherry doctrine to admit hearsay.
Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: Whether a Coconspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right to Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 300 (2011).
207
Giles v. California, 455 U.S. 353, 365.
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208

intimidation by the defendant, the threat of witness intimidation by
other gang members would remain, particularly in cases where entire
209
communities are silenced by gang terrorization and control. Given
the high occurrence of witness intimidation by gangs and the broad
influence of gangs’ “code of silence” over the communities under
gang control, forfeiture by wrongdoing would lessen the incentive for
gangs to intimidate witnesses on behalf of a gang member-defendant
to prevent admission of testimony.
Just three years after the adoption of the Sixth Amendment,
courts recognized that the confrontation right was “founded on
210
natural justice,” notions of which are violated when a gang memberdefendant is granted a windfall resulting from the terror that his
gang inflicts on adverse witnesses and the community at large. Where
a defendant’s associates act independently to prevent witness
testimony, the defendant may benefit and even escape prosecution
211
altogether. Where the defendant expects this benefit yet continues
212
his gang membership, he should forfeit his right to confrontation.
III. CONCLUSION
The problem of witness intimidation by street and prison gangs
is a serious impediment to justice, not only because it can undermine
the prosecution of crime but also because it fosters a dynamic of fear
and isolation in gang-controlled communities. Gangs have an
incentive to silence witnesses because, unless the prosecution can

208

See D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking
Innocence Into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 907
(2012) (arguing that a defendant’s motive to intimidate would be reduced by a
procedure allowing for deposition of prosecution witnesses followed by a reasonable
opportunity for cross-examination by the defense, “coupled with the understanding
that if anything happens to the witness before trial that results in unavailability or
substantial change in position, the deposition will be available for use by the jury”).
In fact, Marian statutes “directed justices of the peace to take the statements of felony
suspects and the persons bringing the suspects before the magistrate, and to certify
those statements to the court,” and these “confronted statements” were admissible
even if the declarant died or was unable to travel to court. Giles, 544 U.S. at 359
(citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43–44; J. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in
the Renaissance 10–12, 16–20 (1974)).
209
See, e.g., Kocieniewski, supra note 10; Witnesses at Risk, supra note 10.
210
E.g., State v. Webb, 2. N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794).
211
See, e.g., Witnesses at Risk, supra note 10 (describing examples of gang crimes
that remain unsolved or unprosecuted because witnesses are scared to testify).
212
“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes confrontation claims
on essentially equitable grounds.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62; see also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879); PARK, supra note 134.
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trace the conduct back to the defendant, statements by the
unavailable witness are generally inadmissible at trial. To combat
gang-perpetrated intimidation, legislatures should ensure forfeiture
by wrongdoing is a hearsay exception in each jurisdiction.
Prosecutors should, where gangs successfully make declarants
unavailable, utilize the forfeiture doctrine by providing evidence that
a gang member-defendant both had knowledge of his gang “no
snitching” policy and had a reasonable expectation of profiting from
enforcement. Finally, courts should, where the evidence sufficiently
satisfies the preponderance standard, treat such defendants as if they
specifically intended the witness to be made unavailable. This would
preserve the right to confrontation—and its exceptions—as it existed
at common law and as it endures as a constitutional safeguard;
moreover, it would meet the Giles standard insofar as it might apply.
213
Witness intimidation “strikes at the heart of justice,” but courts and
legislatures have it within their power to strike back at the gangs that
terrorize their communities. By maximizing the effect of the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the incentive to intimidate
witnesses will diminish, and the statements of witnesses made silent by
gangs will nonetheless be heard in a court of law.
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United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982).

